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**POLISH ARMED FORCES OF 2000:
DEMANDS AND CHANGES**

by

Artur A Bogowicz

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Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Donald Abenheim
Bert Patenaude

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This thesis provides some recommendations for the professional improvement of the Polish Armed Forces while maintaining a conscript type of military. Much of the literature suggests that some countries transform their militaries into an all-volunteer force to achieve a better quality of military and to solve the problem of manpower as well as lack of society acceptance. This thesis begins with the case studies of countries that have transitioned their militaries to an all-volunteer force e.g. the United States, Holland, and others. It also addresses a country that did not, Germany. The next part of this thesis examines the historical overview of the civil-military relationship in Poland, and focuses on the problems that Polish Army confronts today. First, analysis indicates that the countries that transitioned to an all-volunteer force did not achieve their goals; they still maintain their manpower shortages and lack of society's acceptance. Second, even if an all-volunteer force was achieved, Poland would not be able to economically maintain it. Based on this analysis, this thesis concludes that the Polish Armed Forces should maintain a conscript type of the military, while increasing the quality and professionalism of its staff, as indicated by the German Army.

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Artur A. Bogowicz
Captain, Polish Army
B.S., Infantry Military Academy, 1993


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


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
Approved by:



Donald Abenheim, Thesis Advisor



Bert Patenaude, Second Reader



Frank Petho, Chairman
Department of National Security
Affairs

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	DECLINE OF MASS ARMIES IN EUROPE-ATLANTIC REGION. THEORETICAL INSIGHTS.....	7
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	7
B.	THE THEORIES AND CAUSES.....	9
C.	CASE STUDIES.....	14
1.	French Case.....	14
2.	West German Case.....	17
3.	British Case.....	25
4.	Netherlands and Belgium Case.....	35
5.	The United States Case.....	39
6.	Spanish Case.....	45
D.	CONCLUSIONS.....	53
III.	THE POLISH ARMED FORCES: THE HISTORY AND THE FUTURE...55	
A.	THE POLISH ARMY FROM 1945 to 1986.....	55
1.	Short history.....	55
2.	The Armed Forces: Missions, Organization.....	63
3.	The Military and Economy.....	63
4.	Manpower.....	65
5.	Education, Training, and Promotion.....	68
B.	1981-1989: THE POLISH ARMY COLLAPSE.....	71
C.	THE FIRST ATTEMPT AT REFORMS.....	73

IV. CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS, PROPOSALS FOR POLICY AND	
FORCE STRUCTURE.....	81
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	87
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	91

I. INTRODUCTION

The Polish Armed Forces, like most former Communist armies, faced the problem of reorganizing their military forces to prepare them to accomplish their new missions after the collapse of the bipolar world system. This thesis will examine the current status of the Polish Armed forces, its structure, organization, training and preparation to meet the new challenges connected to its NATO membership. Then, it will look at the case studies of some Western countries that have changed their armies to an all-volunteer force, and those that still have a conscripted type of army, and draw some lessons that will be useful to Poland. Finally, this thesis will make some recommendations for possible changes in the Polish armed forces without excessive financial costs.

“Since the late nineteenth century most Great Powers (Germany for example) and the smaller European states have found a satisfactory solution to their manpower needs in the cadre-conscript system. Such a system provides a state with large numbers of adequately trained men and usually at reasonable cost, since conscripts have rarely been well paid.”¹ This kind of system was a very useful organization for mid-size countries, like Poland, that were members of the bigger military organizations like the Warsaw Pact or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and had to be ready to deploy a significant number of troops in a very short time. There were a few advantages to keeping this type of military system.

¹ Eliot A. Cohen, *Citizen and Soldier* (London: Cornell University Press, 1985), 29.

First, "a cadre-conscript system provided a state with substantial, immediately usable forces."² Second, this type of system allowed "for the creation of a substantial reserve of former soldiers who can be recalled to the colors"³ whenever the country needs them. "In addition, a cadre-conscript system does not interfere with a country's economic life, because participants in it have usually not yet entered the work force; indeed, their value as workers may be enhanced by the vocational training they receive and such habits of discipline as they acquire while in military service."⁴

Because of these advantages, the conscript system was a very useful tool for the communist regime in Poland. Using that system, the regime's authorities created an atmosphere of national responsibility towards the country and at the same time they were able to easily control the activity of their society. Briefly, this system gave the Polish society a sense of national identity, security, and civil-military unity.

Along with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and implementation of the democratic reforms by the new government, the popularity of the Armed Forces dropped significantly. It was caused first by growing competition on the labor market, and second by society seeing the army as the remains of the former communist regime.

"The growing public criticism of the draft...and especially the resistance of the younger generation, have placed policy makers under continuous pressure."⁵

² Ibid., 28.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

The continuous reduction of the military forces and their budget caused dissatisfaction within the military cadre, too. The low level of military readiness degraded the security and stability of the country. This caused the policy-makers and people in uniform to start thinking about some changes in the structure and organization of the Polish Armed Forces. In addition, proposed membership in NATO and OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) had an additional impact on policy-makers who began to think about the problem of modernization.

Membership in NATO and the need to have an army ready to accomplish tasks correlated with the new NATO missions such as peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations provided additional reasons for discussion. This leads us to the next problem that the Polish army faces: "a nearly lack of professional NCOs in the Western sense."⁶ The Polish army relies on the draft NCOs in the second year of service, or even in the first year after a three-month training period in the NCO's Training Centers. Their level of proficiency is so low that they are unable to perform their tasks as squad leaders or Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) drivers or gunners, not to mention more sophisticated branches like Air Defense (AD) or Navy.

The next reason for changes is the level of maintenance and readiness of the military equipment in the units. After three months of training, the conscript soldiers are unable to use and properly maintain the more technically sophisticated equipment. By the time their knowledge is sufficient to perform their work, they have to leave the army, and their positions are taken by other new freshmen.

⁶ Ibid., 29.

"The development of military systems, technically, economically, and socio-politically, follows a similar logic based on differentiation and economization. The more the internal military division of labor grows, the higher the tendency becomes to rely on the well-trained professional soldiers."⁷

In the current situation, military service is steadily being shortened from twenty-four to eighteen months, and now to twelve months. It is impossible for the commanders to train their soldiers to accomplish difficult military tasks. The Polish Armed Forces must make a decision: what reforms should be made in the Polish army?

One of the ideas that is very popular in current Western European societies is the creation of an all-volunteer force or quasi-volunteer force. This kind of army would:

- Be smaller in size (perhaps by as much as 30 percent);
- Involve far fewer conscripts (if any, but no more than 25-30 percent) in primary military positions;
- Involve far specialists and technicians in a more highly differentiated role structure.⁸

These and other problems will be the subjects of this thesis in the following chapters. First, I will talk about the new trend in Europe called "The Decline of the Mass Armies:" its causes and results. Then, I will discuss the current phase of reforms in the Polish Armed Forces in comparison to those of other European

⁷ Karl W. Haltiner, "The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe?" *Armed Forces & Society*, (Fall 1998): 8.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

countries. And finally, we will present new ideas to solve the most acute problems in the Polish Armed Forces.

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II. DECLINE OF MASS ARMIES IN EURO-ATLANTIC REGION: THEORETICAL INSIGHTS

A. INTRODUCTION

The "Decline of Mass Armies" is a term that became very popular in Europe and the United States during the last decade of the twentieth century. "The ideal form of military organization in the liberal democracies of Western Europe and North America has changed fundamentally since World War II. The mass armies in which all citizens are mobilized to fight when needed have been displaced to a large degree by smaller, professional forces in which only some serve, with this service being their primary occupation."⁹

A number of Western European countries have gradually reduced their military forces, as can be seen in Table 1.

	1964	1968	1973
Belgium	110,000	99,000	89,600
Britain	425,000	427,000	361,500
Denmark	52,000	46,000	39,800
France	625,000	505,000	503,000
Netherlands	124,000	129,000	112,200
Norway	37,000	35,000	35,900

Table1: Comparison of Military Manpower.¹⁰

This trend is so strong that most observers predict that by 2010 most Western countries will have all-volunteer forces.

⁹ James Burk, "The Decline of Mass Armed Forces and Compulsory Military Service," *Defense Analysis*, vol. 8, no. 1 (1992): 42.

¹⁰ Jacques Van Doorn, "The Decline of the Mass Army in the West," *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 1, no. 2, (Winter 1975): 148.

In this chapter I are going to find out why all these changes have occurred by looking at the countries that reorganized their forces or that are in the process of reorganization. I will also see what kinds of problems these countries had to overcome to accomplish a successfully planned transition. I will look at the case studies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and West Germany, to better understand what led those countries to stay with the draft or to transform their military forces into all-volunteer or semi-volunteer armies. Finally, I will examine whether or not the transition to an all-volunteer force solved the problems that those armies faced in the previous system.

B. THE THEORIES AND CAUSES

I cannot say that the same trends caused each country to make transitions in their military systems. I also cannot say that all of the armies in the democratic societies will abandon the draft in the future. But I can say that "there is substantial variation among countries making the transition from one to the other model of military organization as to whether they maintain or abandon some form of compulsory military service. Only four of the 14 nations in NATO (including France) abandoned conscription after 1945."¹¹ The first countries that transformed their armies were Canada and Luxemburg after World War II, Great Britain in 1962, and the United States in 1973. The other nations stayed with the conscript or modified the compulsory service, but still rely on the conscript as the main military obligation of their citizens. The question is: "How is this variation to be explained?"¹²

There are two scholarly approaches that deal with that problem: the "political realist" and "social dominance" approaches. "Political realists contend that decisions about the military obligation of citizens reflect considerations of cost and technical efficiency. Social dominance theories focus on whether or not citizens accept compulsory military service as a legitimate value worth supporting."¹³

There are some cases that, of course, do not fit well with any of the approaches presented above. For example, Great Britain and the United States claimed that nuclear weaponry allowed them to reduce the size of their military

¹¹ Ibid., 46.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

forces and create smaller but more professional armies. From the other side, there are countries like France and Belgium, which claimed that abandoning the draft, enabled them to achieve big budget savings. Thus, the military scientists created an alternative approach called the "social dominance" approach. This approach "contends that whether political elites establish obligatory or voluntary military service depends on the prior willingness of citizens to accept either policy as legitimate."¹⁴ The question is how to predict the willingness of the citizens. There are many variables, which should be taken into account when considering the type of military service, which would best suit the citizens of a certain country. The most common factors are the history of the country, the nature of its relationship with neighboring countries, and the level of acceptance of the military forces by the society. In the Polish case, there are at least three factors that sparked the beginning of the discussion of reforms within the military forces in Poland. One was the low level of education of the youth population, which has a big impact on the sense of patriotic responsibility towards the country and society. "Another was high level of material abundance which supported a strong preference for consumerism and recoil at the relative deprivation required by military service. And third was the declining appeal of nationalism, which undermined the motive for public service."¹⁵

Specifically, the two last factors are the most important for the Polish case. The trend of globalization, characterized by free trade, reduced importance of

¹⁴ Ibid., 47.

¹⁵ Ibid., 48.

national borders, and a cultured mix caused the deterioration of national traditions, feelings, and values within the Polish society, especially in the young and middle aged segment of the population. The idea of a consumer society, a concept from the United States, caused substantial damage to the European societies, including Poland. Traditional values were replaced by values built on "the ideology of money." In the section on case studies we will examine each mentioned country that has an all-volunteer or draft military, or that is in the process of transition in order to discuss the pros and cons of that transition. Our discussion will begin with the countries that had very similar economical and military potential and played similar important roles in the political sphere of the world.

"Britain, France, Germany and the United States are evidently similar in their levels of economic, political and military development. During the Cold War era, each nation developed a military organization closer to a force-in-being than mass armed forces."¹⁶ In the meantime, Great Britain and the United States abandoned the draft, while France and Germany did not. Both countries retained conscription because of tradition, strategic situation, political culture, and differing strategic posture from that of the United Kingdom and the United States. The question is, why did France and Germany not follow their allies?

To answer that question, we should first analyze the factors of territoriality and constitutionality. "The territorial borders of nations define a stock of material resources which is readily available for use within society. They establish the region over which national institutions expect to exercise authority and control. They also

¹⁶ Ibid., 49.

provide a concrete symbol—a picture—of the nation to which one belongs. In this way, territorial boundaries form a national identity, which is both a collective identity and part of a person's self-identity. The defense of boundaries, and of the identities they help construct, is evidence of a nation's 'integrative power.'¹⁷ This means the countries that had or have not had such peaceful histories with their neighbors will be more willing to have the conscript type of army than an all-volunteer one. In that case, the draft army is giving its country much more available manpower in the event of a military conflict that occurs with short notice. "Evidence of integration is also found in the particular constitution of the nation which specifies the organization and powers of its government and of the people and groups who participate in the exercise of power. Differences in national constitutions represent accommodations, recent and old, between various contenders for deference and authority in the nation and over different conceptions about how power and resources ought to be exercised protected and distributed. When nations experience territorial and constitutional crises, their central government is likely to rely on a compulsory system of citizen service to raise the manpower for the military."¹⁸ In case of a bigger conflict, the all-volunteer forces do not meet the contingency for the warring country.

"For totalitarian states conscription has had peculiar attractions. If one definition of totalitarian system is a warfare or siege state, universal military service offers a peculiarly potent tool for cultivating a sense of impending struggle. It offers such states one more tool to organize and regiment the lives of their subjects, and it

¹⁷ Ibid., 49-50.

¹⁸ Ibid., 50.

may help create the sense of constant and potent foreign threat against which one must always be on guard. Even rudimentary forms of military service offer a chance to make a population commit itself, willy-nilly, to the goals of a regime."¹⁹

Most of the countries in the former Warsaw Pact where the ruling government behaved like a regime had the conscript type of army.

¹⁹ Ibid., 33.

C. CASE STUDIES

1. French Case

"Fewer than four months after the French army's defeat at Dienbienphu in May 1954, which ended its control over Indochina, the French were embroiled in a conflict with indigenous Moslem rebels over control of Algeria."²⁰ This conflict was more a boundary conflict than a colonial war. The close contact between the two countries caused France to treat Algeria as a French territory. "When François Mitterrand, then Minister of Interior, proclaimed that 'Algeria is France,' he expressed the prevailing policy of the government of Mendes-France to treat armed resistance by the Front de Libération Nationale as a war of secession. Army officers linked the two conflicts, in their increasingly political rhetoric, to the Cold War fight against Soviet-inspired Communist aggression, which threatened to encircle France. Such a world-view lent urgency to the slogan 'one nation from Dunkerque to Tamanrasset' used to rally European settlers in Algeria to their cause."²¹ This caused many of the civilian administrative posts to be run by the military in what finally brought on one of the most serious political crises in the history of France, and the collapse of the Fourth Republic in favor of de Gaulle. De Gaulle advocated the course of action that would lead to Algeria's independence.

Over time, the position of the military in Algeria strengthened to the point that it plotted against the government. "The most dramatic event for our purposes was the attempted 'putsch' led by Generals Raoul Salan and Maurice Challe. Their

²⁰ James Burk, "The Decline of Mass Armed Forces and Compulsory Military Service," *Defense Analysis* vol. 8, no. 1 (1992): 50.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 51.

revolt and seizure of power in Algeria on 21 April 1961 would soon be followed, it was feared, by a march on Paris.”²² After that event, De Gaulle reacted decisively to not allow military forces to take power in the capital by dispersing them throughout the country. “But the significant event was de Gaulle’s moving broadcast to the nation in which he called on all soldiers to disobey the rebel leaders. Conscripts, who had been fighting in Algeria since 1956, heeded de Gaulle’s call. They remained in the barracks. As one conscript asked: ‘If the officers can disobey de Gaulle, why can’t we disobey our officers when they turn against the nation?’ Public refusal by conscripts to obey their superiors provided important (if only symbolic) confirmation of the liberal political theory that a conscript army was needed to guarantee the persistence of democratic regimes”²³

As soon as De Gaulle solved the situation, he reshaped the French forces into a force-in-being. But in comparison to Great Britain, there was no movement to abandon conscription. Some changes were made in terms of conscript service and conscientious objection was legally recognized for the first time in 1963. This consensus allowed keeping the conscript type of army in France until now, with some minor changes, such as shortening the military service to twelve months.

According to the latest information, the French government plans to end conscription in 2002, followed by Belgium and Holland.

When we look at the history of Poland and the successful coup organized by its army, we can say that the French case seems very important for further

²² Ibid., 51.

²³ Ibid.

discussion. We can conclude with the following suggestion. First, the conscript army prevents the military from having too much control over the means of violence and achieving too much power over the civilians. Second, the conscript army creates a stronger relationship between the military and the society, which brings a better understanding between them.

2. West German Case

The German Army case is particularly interesting because it is the only Western European country that has retained the draft system. More interesting is the fact that the quality of the German conscripts remains so good. Their army, specially the land components, is regarded by experts as among the best in the world. Why does not the German Army want to change to an all-volunteer-force? And, will Germany stay with a mainly conscript type army? Those and other questions fill in the content of this section.

By looking back into the history of the German Armed Forces, we can understand more precisely why the German military has insisted on keeping the draft system until now. When Germany had an all-volunteer army 1919-1935, the military became radicalized. Very often "the ethos of the professional soldier had too often stood in conflict with the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity that swept Europe and America after 1789."²⁴ That trend led Germany to World War II. In both cases the German officers forget to focus mainly on the skills to defend the security and stability of the country. Instead they focused on the handicraft of waging war and domestic politics.

After World War II, the Federal Republic began its work to create a balance between the new German Army and democracy. The Basic Law in 1949 became the framework for the creation of Federal Republic Armed Forces.

²⁴ Donald Abenheim, *German Soldiers and German Unity: Political Foundation of the German Armed Forces*. (California: Naval Post Graduate School, 1991), 5.

"The first line of the Basic Law, that is, Article 1, Paragraph One states that: 'Human dignity is untouchable. All state power is to protect and respect it.'" ²⁵

The main idea of this law was to keep the Armed Forces far away from those people who would like to use them for the unprofessional, undemocratic ideas.

It did not mean that the military would have the right to decide, in the democratic way, if they should obey the order or not. The new German Army was created as "an army in democracy" based on the following principles: "first, the integration of a conscription army into the new German democracy; secondly, the integration of the new armed forces into the Atlantic Alliances; and finally, the creation of an inner structure of the Bundeswehr that would accord with the principles of the constitution." ²⁶ The new Bundeswehr was created on the four pillars closely related to the ideas of "Staatsbuerger in Uniform" and "Inner Führung." First, it was said in "Article 87" that the army will be merely defensive: "The Federation establishes armed forces for defense." ²⁷ Second, Bundeswehr was going to be the defender of the "parliamentary democracy". Third pillar was related to the idea of "the citizen in uniform." "The founders of the Bundeswehr as Graf Kielmansegg, Graf Baudissin, and Ulrich de Maizière, insisted that the soldier on duty must experience daily the same liberal and democratic values he has sworn to defend." ²⁸

²⁵ Ibid., 10-11.

²⁶ Ibid., 11.

²⁷ Ibid., 12.

²⁸ Ibid., 14.

Fourthly, the founders of Bundeswehr decided that German Armed Forces would rely on the draft soldiers as the main core. "They did so to underscore the principle that national defense stands among the duties of every citizen. The draftees also further integrate the military into society as they frustrate the rise of a caste mentality so typical of a professional army."²⁹

Soon after World War II, because of Soviet expansion westward, Germany was divided into two spheres of influence, including the capital, Berlin, West and East Germany. "Under those circumstances, the Britain, France, and the United States moved to end their occupation of West Germany in 1949 by constituting the Federal Republic."³⁰ The three powers also agreed that the future reunification of Germany was possible, but they hoped that Germany would stay under Western influence. The strong expansionist policy of the Soviet Union and its Allies forced the Western Powers to agree on the creation of the German Armed Forces. "For the surprise of everybody in 1950, fewer than forty percent of male respondents said they were prepared to join the army if West Germany was attacked by the East."³¹ In addition, the main German political party, the Social Democratic Party objected to the armament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). They were afraid that history could repeat itself. "Nonetheless, negotiations began in 1950 between Britain, France, the United States, and Federal Republic on the question of West German rearmament. Despite French reservation, the Allies believed West German

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ James Burk, "The Decline of Mass Armed Forces and Compulsory Military Service" *Defense Analysis*, vol. 8, No. 1, 52.

³¹ Ibid., 53.

assistance was required to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe.”³² French hesitation towards the German rearmament was dictated by a constant fear of a resurgent Germany and another war. This is the same attitude the French government had before World War I and World War II.

The same fear also existed in Germany. In addition to strong opposition from SPD already mentioned, Chancellor Adenauer publicly showed a strong objection to this initiative. In the end, with France reticent, the allies agreed to include West Germany as a full member of NATO. It happened in 1955 with the signing of the Paris Treaties.

From the beginning, the force was to be a defensive force-in-being, without aggressive capabilities, but designed to deter future Soviet aggression within the framework of the NATO alliances. Domestically, raising an armed force of 500,000 posed enormous constitutional problems for the Federal Republic, not the least of which was to specify the military obligations of citizens. “The substantive problem West Germany faced was to create a relatively large and effective armed force, which meant relying on former Wehrmacht personnel, without reproducing the militaristic traditions and practices that historically were hostile to liberal political democracy.”³³ Facing that problem, the West German Parliament created a series of constitutional amendments, federal laws, and regulations to guarantee the civil control over the armed forces.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

Today, the German Armed Forces are still in favor of the draft army, which may be less professional, but is still an army based on the idea of the "citizen in uniform." But, similar to the past reforms of United States and Holland, or those underway in France and Spain today, many people are asking about the future of conscription in the German Armed Forces. In the last ten years "the armed forces were reduced from 700,000 to 320,000 men, and that defense spending in relation to the GDP declined from nearly 3 percent to 1.5 percent during the same period."³⁴ Also the Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, is talking about further cuts over the next four years.

Another problem that the German Army faces is the strong support for an all-volunteer force; taking into account the new role and tasks that the German army will have to accomplish as a NATO member in the future.

According to the leader of the German Greens Party, Juergen Trittin, the German Army should cut its forces "to 150,000 by 2002 and further reduce the number of troops to 75,000 by 2006." He also said "the Greens wanted to get rid of Germany's military conscription system and instead create a volunteer force."³⁵

In addition to that, one of the most important topics in German newspapers are the women in the armed forces. So far "German military conscription is limited to men and only 2,900 volunteer women serve in the armed forces where they are

³⁴ "German Defense Minister Rejects Professional Army." DdpADN, 25 January 2000. Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS/ALLNWS/ (German and Armed Forces and Consript). [8 February 2000].

³⁵ "Greens: Slash German Armed Forces to 75,000." *International News*, 16 September 1997. Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS/ALLNWS/ (German and Armed Forces and Consript). [8 February 2000].

limited to being on medical staff or musicians.”³⁶ Similar to the debate over an all-volunteer force, there are a lot of voices for and against to this idea.

Change will come. One of the reasons is the increased German role in NATO and EU organization. “Leading military officials believe that, even in the future, it will be necessary to have about 200,000 conscript, period-service and career soldiers to be able to meet all NATO and EU tasks. The number of conscripts, however, should considerably decrease, from 135,000 to 85,000. To make sure that the system remains ‘fair’, basic military service may be shortened from 10 to six months.”³⁷ It means that the future German Armed Forces will be still conscript with an all-volunteer soldiers amendment, smaller, very mobile, and able to conduct a military operation in a distant hot spot.

But one can ask the question, what about the German Law forbidding the German soldiers taking an action beyond the national border. Everything changes, and more and more often we can hear about an amendment to the German constitution allowing the German soldiers to conduct certain military operations beyond the national border. Even without that amendment, “the German ECR Tornados took part in operation ‘Deny Flight’ and a 4,000-strong Bundeswehr

³⁶ “Women in The Armed Forces? Germany Says ‘No.’ *International News*, 11 August 11 1997. Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS/ALLNWS/ (German and Armed Forces and Conscript). [8 February 2000].

³⁷ “Report on Cuts in German Armed Forces Deemed Realistic.” *DdpADN*, 17 December 1999. Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS/ALLNWS/ (German and Armed Forces and Conscript). [8 February 2000].

logistics contingent stationed in Croatia was supporting NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia."³⁸

In conclusion one can say that German Armed Forces wait the deep reform process to fit them to the new challenges related to the NATO and EU membership. Also the political and social changes that take place in German society are going to have a big impact on the future shape of the German Army. So far the German Army will retain the conscript type of force with increased participation of the volunteer soldiers, because of two reasons. First, it is the civil-military cooperation, and the idea of the soldier as the citizen in uniform. Second, Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping once said there was "no reason for abolishing compulsory military service in Germany. There is questionable [sic] whether a professional army would really be cheaper."³⁹

His opinion about the cost of the volunteer army is based on the French case. France, to create the professional army, reduced its forces by twenty five percent, and at the same time it achieved a cost increased by about thirty percent.

Also, the problems with recruiting in the United States and Great Britain, that we previously mentioned, has discouraged the German civil and military authorities to take a decisive step towards an all-volunteer force in Germany.

³⁸ "Bonn Defense Minister Criticizes French Plan to Drop Draft." *International News*, 1 March 1996. Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS/ALLNWS/ (German and Armed Forces and Conscript). [8 February 2000].

³⁹ "German Defense Minister Rejects Professional Army." *DdpADN*, 25 January 2000. Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS/ALLNWS/ (German and Armed Forces and Conscript). [8 February 2000].

When we look at the Polish dilemma concerning the future shape of the Polish Armed Forces, those observations made by Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping seem very important and must be considered in our discussion.

3. British Case

Great Britain is a country that decided a long time ago about the nature of its military service. From the early days, the British were convinced that a large conscript army could be a big threat to their freedoms and security. British society took into account the geographical position of its country and claimed that the most important military branch to keep was the Navy; the other components should be created only in a small form. "In the eighteenth century, subsidies to European powers and small regular contingents of British troops had been sufficient to maintain the national interest. In the Peninsular War of 1808–1814 the British Army in the field never exceeded 80,000 men, and at Waterloo in 1815 the British contingent numbered only 24,000 out of an allied force of some 68,000. During the nineteenth century, Britain relied mainly on native troops and the overwhelming power of the Navy to guard her overseas possessions."⁴⁰ In the nineteenth century, British officers, like all soldiers, did not received insignificant wages. "For the great part of the nineteenth century, England's army officers were 'gentlemen first, landed gentry almost always, professionals almost never. Her common soldiers were the restless, the misfits, the unhappy...(with)...the standing of second class citizens.'"⁴¹ The army consisted of the poorest, uneducated part of society. The same situation took place in other countries as well.

A big change in Great Britain came with industrial technology and the new ideas caused by the Enlightenment. "The urbanization and industrialization of the

⁴⁰ Peter J. Dietz and J. F. Stone, "The British All-Volunteer Army" *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 1, no. 2 (February 1975): 159.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 159.

nineteenth century profoundly altered the social structure as well as provided more opportunities for employment. Increasing job opportunities reduced the already limited number of potential recruits for the army."⁴² This change in the labor market in Britain and constant wars in the British colonial countries, which were draining military resources, forced the British government to think about reforms in the army. The reforms created by Cardwell and Haldane brought a lot of significant changes and improvements into the British Army. "By the end of the nineteenth century, the purchase system for commissions had been abolished, the social base of officer recruitment was broadening, and the professionalization of the officer corps had begun. For soldiers, short service engagements had been introduced, good conduct pay and pensions had been increased, overseas tours had been shortened, educational and leisure-time activities had started, ration scales had been improved, and pay was finally raised from the shilling-a-day at which it has stood for a hundred years."⁴³ The British authorities realized that to attract young people to join the army they had to give them the same or even better conditions in comparison to the civilian labor market. To the surprise of scholars, this drastic change did not improve the number of military cadres in the British army.

During World War I, the cadre situation of the army improved significantly but only for a period of two years. Soon after the war, the British army faced its biggest manpower crisis in its history, which remained until 1939. In 1936 "there was a deficit of 10,000 men, which was expected to increase to 31,000 by 1940.

⁴² Ibid., 160.

⁴³ Ibid.

The effect of this was shown dramatically in the case of infantry battalions. In 1934, the average strength of a home service battalion including recruits at the depot was 689, of whom 111 were recruits under training and 270 were battalion staff and specialists. As early as 1938, it was estimated that the system would break down."⁴⁴ New solutions were needed.

This situation forced the British government to introduce compulsory service in May 1939. On the eve of total war, the British government could not afford to leave the manpower problem unsolved.

After World War II, Great Britain retained the conscript army until 1962. The foreign policy of that country, and the creation of the bipolar system characterized by the Cold War in which Britain played a significant role, had a large impact on the increase of the military expenditures in Britain. During 1952-57, Great Britain allocated ten percent of its gross national product (GNP) to military expenditures. "The Suez campaign of 1956 had further increased defense costs and had also raised doubts about Britain's military effectiveness."⁴⁵

The Suez campaign was the turning point for the British Army. Politicians and society agreed on the need for military reforms. "This led to a radical revision of defense policy, which was announced in the 1957 'White Paper' introduced by then Defense Minister, Duncan Sandys."⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Ibid., 161.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 162.

To summarize, the White Paper's doctrine assumed that an advanced nuclear power with high technology would allow significant decreases in spending on the British Armed Forces, which would bring big savings.

The problem was that the producers of the White Paper did not predict many aspects, mainly the economy of the country, which had a big impact on the capabilities of the army. "The defense budget for 1962-63 was set at seven percent of GNP. The subsequent pressure of rising costs and the continuing economic difficulties of the government induced further defense cuts in 1967. Defense expenditures for 1967-68 was estimated at 6.5 percent of GNP and just fewer than 6 percent for 1969-1970.

In spite of the significant reduction in military expenditure, the British army had to conduct a number of small overseas missions with reduced manpower strength. "In January 1963, for example, about 30 percent of infantry battalions were between 50 and 100 men below establishment. Even by March 1965, when the overall manpower shortage had been reduced to 2 percent, some infantry battalions were still 15 percent under strength."⁴⁷

Since the end of conscription in 1962 and with a continuous lack of manpower, the British Army relied heavily on civil labor to fill static and administrative posts. This is about "88 percent of the total number of military personnel. By contrast, in the United States the equivalent proportion of civilians employed by the defense establishment in 1970 was only 34 percent."⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Ibid., 163.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

To fill the gap in the needs for manpower, the British Army first decreased the requirements for the new candidates in terms of age, fitness, and education. By lowering the age of entry to the army, "the numbers in junior soldier and apprentice training units in the army alone increased from 4,274 in 1956 to 10,404 in 1966. Of sergeants and above serving in the army in 1969, 7,972 out of a total of 29,730 started as boys or junior soldiers. In addition, over 900 officers serving at that time also started as juniors."⁴⁹

Lowering the age of entry to seventeen years also had disadvantages. It was impossible to send a trained soldier overseas until he was eighteen years old. So for almost half of the first year a trained soldier was unproductive. Also, young soldiers needed special care such as "special safeguards and special educational, medical, religious, and welfare staff. Special standards of accommodation, clothing, and rationing are also necessary and so the young entry system produces a very expensive recruit indeed."⁵⁰ The only advantage to lowering the entry age was that the problem of manpower was solved entirely.

The observations, which were made during that period of time, might be significant for our further discussion. First, there was a correlation between massive unemployment in Britain between 1969 and 1972 and much improved recruiting figures. The higher the unemployment ratio, the better the recruiting proportions. In 1972 when the unemployment rate was falling quickly, the decline in recruiting was as rapid as the improvement noticed in 1968.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 167.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 168.

Another observation which was made, concerned the rate of payment compared to the decrease in manpower. "The high pay is not a tradition of the British services but reasonable pay, although it may not be a powerful recruiting factor, can be seen to keep soldiers in. A soldier will obviously think very hard about leaving the service, other things being equal, if by doing so he must take a drop in pay. A private soldier without a trade who, after discharge, settles in Scotland or in certain parts of Northern England will find it difficult to find work at the rate he was receiving in the forces. If he is married, as the vast majority are, he will also have to find accommodation for his family if he leaves the service."⁵¹ That is one of the strongest bargaining cards in attracting young boys to the army. The army gives a young boy some type of security for him and his family through the stability of the job, a very reasonable salary, health care for him and his family, and living accommodations.

We might think that these factors mentioned above are the most important reasons for young boys to join the army, but not quite. According to a poll "‘adventure’ or ‘seeing the world’ was given as the most important reason, training in a trade as second, with prospects of a new life as third. Further down on the list appear security, good money, healthy life, and friendship, whilst unemployment or the fear of it did not figure at all in 1965 and came at the bottom of the list in 1969."⁵²

⁵¹ Ibid., 172.

⁵² Ibid., 173.

We can also add that these values change along with the age of the military man. For the older person, it is probable that security of life, not adventure, becomes the most important factor.

Let us look now at the officer corps in the British Army. "By March 1963 the officer corps was under strength by 800 officers and the situation worsened during 1963-64."⁵³ One way to solve the problem was "to retain older officers to cover shortfalls occurring among the younger age group. In 1972, 43 percent of the officer corps was aged 40 or over (only about 7 percent of soldiers are in this category). Another means of covering the shortage of young subalterns is to commission older men both from civilian life and from the ranks."⁵⁴ This solution was only a short-term answer to the problem, because the main problem was still how to supply enough young officers to the operational units in the combat arms.

There were a few reasons why young boys did not want to go into the army. First, as we mentioned at the beginning there was the traditional hostile attitude, not only of young men, but also of the whole society, towards a standing army, and because of that young boys totally rejected the idea of association with the army. Second, there was "the uncertainty about the army's future created by defense cuts."⁵⁵ Young boys did not want to get tied up with the organization without any perspective, and with the constant reduction of personnel. Third, there was a diminishing opportunity for the overseas service in the more exotic posts. Large

⁵³ Ibid., 175.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 176.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 178.

civilian corporations were offering greater opportunities for travel and swifter career advancement to higher salary levels.

The next problem, which the British army faced, was a big outflow of officers from the service. "The Prices and Income Board's investigations included an inquiry into the reasons why officers were leaving the service; one of the main reasons advanced was the declining status of a military career."⁵⁶ Most officers at the rank of captain and major were leaving the army due to a lack of prospects for a further career or self-advancement.

The first method for solving that problem was a creation of the new pattern of officer recruitment. "The traditional source of recruitment—the public schools—was providing a steadily reducing proportion of candidates and self-recruitment was also on the decline. Middle-class candidates predominated but many more of those than hitherto came from the state sector of education, mainly from grammar schools.

More candidates from the lower socioeconomic groups were coming forward and comprehensive schools were beginning to be represented."⁵⁷ The social base of recruitment is now much broader than previously. Also, entry to military schools was organized so that younger people were able to enter the officer corps. "Flexibility has been achieved through the creation of various types of commissions which have different standards and modes of entry."⁵⁸

The next solution came from sociological research about how to attract young boys to join the army. In 1975, "the study of the attitudes of young serving officers

⁵⁶ Ibid., 180.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

compared with those of their civilian counterparts toward their respective careers has revealed important differences in job satisfaction between the military and civilians. Officers value the physical challenge of their career and the opportunities it provides for character development in an outdoor environment. These are not factors of any importance to civilians in managerial positions in industry, commerce, or the civil service. On the other hand, young officers do not seem to give much weight to personal advancement or wealth which are regarded as much more important in civilians. Many officers appear to have deliberately selected an army career as a preferred alternative to the civilian way of life; they put group values above individual values, accept the authority, order, and hierarchy of the profession, and regard leadership as the development of group achievement and morale."⁵⁹

The conclusion is that the armed forces should attract boys with a special set of values and preferences. The question is, how did the British Army do it? First, there was an increased presence of advertisements showing the army perspective and challenge for young boys.

Second, there was increased social-military interaction through activities such as "military aid to the civil community, the work of army youth teams, and liaison with schools, headmasters, and local authorities for recruiting, educational, and welfare purpose."⁶⁰ There was also an increased presence of civilians in the military units working in the posts where an officer presence was irrelevant.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 181.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 184

The officers were more integrated with the civil academic life through membership in the national academic and professional institutions.

These significant changes made by the British Armed Forces caused substantial improvement in the civic attitude towards the army. In addition, the growing popularity of the armed forces had a big impact on the quality of the military profession, which caused a significant improvement in the quality of people applying to military schools. Naturally, these changes did not entirely solve the lack of military manpower, but they stopped the unfavorable trend that appeared in the 1960s in Great Britain.

The British case showed that an all-volunteer force had a significant impact on the increase in quality of the army at each level. But, the British case showed also that the problem with the shortage of men applying to the army did not disappear but even increased. The sad truth is that military forces, even in an all-volunteer type of army, are not able to compete sufficiently with the civilian labor market salaries and work conditions to encourage young people to go into the army. This conclusion is more important for us when we take into account that one of the main problems that forced the Polish army to think about reforms was the shortage of manpower.

4. The Netherlands and Belgium

The draft system in both countries dates Napoleonic era. "During the nineteenth century, draftees were selected through the dual mechanism of lottery and substitution. Roughly speaking, this came down to the better-off paying their way out, while their lower-class 'remplacants' actually served."⁶¹ The normal time of conscript was five months (basic training) in some branches, and in other branches was a little bit longer. After this basic training, soldiers went to the reserve forces, even "at the junior officer level."⁶² During periods of war, the Netherlands and Belgium stayed neutral. The problem began after World War II, when the Netherlands government decided to deploy the Dutch contingent in the East Indies. To legitimize the policy, "the Dutch parliament implemented a constitutional change in 1946. This was a radical breach with history: military action overseas was once the exclusive prerogative of an all-volunteer colonial army."⁶³ With the intensification of the Cold War, the Dutch government returned to the idea of a large army. Both the Netherlands and Belgium increased the time of service up to twenty-four months. This change had a negative impact on the relationship between government and society. The civil population demanded that military service be shortened.

As a solution, "in the 1960s, professionalization of technically demanding functions was tried in both countries. Although some specific projects were

⁶¹ Jan Van Der Meulen and Philippe Manigrant, "Zero Draft in the Low Countries: The Final Shift to the All-Volunteer Force," *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 24 (Winter 1997): 317.

⁶² Ibid

⁶³ Ibid., 318.

successful, generally it proved difficult to attract sufficient volunteers at the required level.”⁶⁴ In the 1960s and 1970s, the young society developed a negative attitude towards the military. Military obligation became very unpopular and was criticized by the youth. This resulted in the Dutch government deciding to shorten military service to twelve months. Everything indicated that the transition to an all-volunteer force was only a question of time. The main fear of the Dutch government was the cost, which the country would have to pay to secure the level of recruitment to this type of army.

These questions and problems disappeared with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Communist regimes in a few countries of Central and Eastern Europe, along with the signing in 1990 by the Dutch government of the CFE treaty. Another factor that played as important a role as the two previously mentioned was the national deficit in most of the European countries.

“In Belgium, the plan Charlier, named after the chief of staff who formulated it, functioned as the point of departure for restructuring and downsizing the armed forces. A pulling back of Belgian forces from Germany, a reduction of personnel as well as cutting of the defense budget, were its central elements.”⁶⁵

Still the Belgian government was not convinced that the transition to an all-volunteer force was viable. The breaking point came in 1993, when “the Dutch minister of Defense, Relus ter Beek, officially announced”⁶⁶ the abolition of the draft. Why did the Dutch government make such a quick decision? First, there was

⁶⁴ Ibid., 318.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 320.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

a big reduction of the armed forces. The recruiting needs decreased to the point that the army needed only one of four young men to serve in the army. The question was how to decide who should serve and who should not. So it was a problem of selection and justice. Second, there were the political changes in Europe after the breakdown of the bipolar system and the new role that armies played in this new arrangement. As a result, both countries "decided to give priority to participation in peacekeeping and crisis management worldwide if necessary. These were tasks typically to be performed, it was generally argued, by highly trained professional soldiers instead of conscripts."⁶⁷

In the Netherlands and Belgium the draft service was more than a system, it was the ideology of a citizen army. At the same time, this type of armed force was a very useful organization to control and coordinate and provided the opportunity to keep a close relationship between society and the people in uniform. "Democracy, citizenship, nation building, civil military integration are among the main assets ascribed to the draft."⁶⁸

This concept lasted until the 1990s, but soon the politicians realized that this no more exists. More and more the public opinion in both countries was more in favor of a volunteer army than a draft military system. "Public opinion in the Netherlands turned around in less than three years: at the end of 1989 a majority still favored conscription; at the end of 1990 the balance pro to con was fifty-fifty; in the spring of 1991 there was a slight majority in favor of an all-volunteer force, which at the

⁶⁷ Ibid., 321.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 315.

end of 1992 had grown to 70 percent.”⁶⁹ The most paradoxical fact about the idea of an all-volunteer force in the Netherlands is that the biggest objection came from the military staff itself. Finally, time showed that with today’s demanding technology, which is in broad use in the army, it is impossible to train young men within six or twelve months. As a result, the governments in the Netherlands and Belgium decided to create smaller but more flexible and fully professional armies. Consequently, Belgium ended the draft 1 January 1994 and the Netherlands 1 January 1998.

The case of Belgium and the Netherlands is interesting to us for two reasons. First, civilians, not the military, started the whole transition. In the case of Holland, the military were even against the reforms, which was something unusual. Second, there are two countries in which the transformation to all-volunteer forces ended with full success, and so far these countries do not have any problems with a shortage of manpower. Of course, if we take into account the size of the armies in other countries, Holland and Belgium had a much easier task to accomplish compared to Great Britain or the United States.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 322.

5. The United States Case

The United States, as we will see, had to transform its military forces into all-volunteer forces for reasons similar to those of Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The main factors were the will of the politicians and the decrease of the army's popularity within society, mainly on the part of young males.

"By the late 1960s, changing demography had fundamentally altered the conditions under which the old draft had operated. No longer, as in the 1950s, would virtually every young man serve in the military; rather, even during the war, barely half of them would. The Selective Service System [similar to the system implemented in the Netherlands], once a source of national pride and even affection, had become a mistrusted institution composed, in the popular mind, of fossilized and callous old men. An institution once thought of as representing the best in American politics now had the reputation of representing the worst."⁷⁰ The problem was how to decide who should serve, who should not, and how to achieve a feeling of justice in young boys.

The idea of abolishing the draft came with President Johnson. But, the United States had to wait for President Nixon to end the draft. "On 27 March 1969, President Nixon appointed a commission headed by former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates to study the prospect of an all-volunteer force."⁷¹

⁷⁰ Cohen, 166.

⁷¹ Ibid.

In February 1970 the Gates Report was ready. The report began with the following statement: "A return to an all-volunteer force will strengthen our freedoms, remove an inequity now imposed on the expression of the patriotism that has never been lacking among our youth, promote the efficiency of the armed forces, and enhance their dignity. It is the system for maintaining standing forces that minimizes government interference with the freedom of the individual to determine his own life in accordance with his values."⁷² It was a typical liberal point of view "when not all our citizens can serve, and when only a small minority are needed, a voluntary decision to serve is the best answer, morally and practically, to the question of who should serve."⁷³ The report also predicted that within ten years the registration procedures of young boys eligible to serve in the army in the case of war would still be conducted, but that no one would be called to the army.

The military staff accepted the idea of an all-volunteer force not with euphoria, but rather with ambivalence. "On the one hand, military men were temperamentally inclined to look kindly on volunteers, since voluntarism is one of the highest of the military virtues. On the other hand, many military men (particularly officers in the army, the service most sharply affected by the advent of the all-volunteer force) feared a sharp decline in standards. There was another source of ambivalence as well.

⁷² Ibid., 168.

⁷³ Ibid., 169.

Initially, many military men found the end of the draft a welcome removal of an irritant to a benign civil-military relationship."⁷⁴ They were afraid that the end of the draft would separate the army from society.

As with the British Armed Forces, the U.S. Army had suffered a similar significant lack of manpower. "In fiscal year 1979, the Army had fallen some 17,000 short of its manpower acquisition goal. Moreover, indicators of quality of the acquisition cohort (percent age of high school graduates and trainability scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test or AFQT) were slipping badly."⁷⁵ To improve that result, the U.S. Armed Forces had to be competitive in a civilian market. From the first fifteen years of having all-volunteer forces, the U.S. military figured out that "When economic conditions worsen and unemployment rises, the Army finds it easier to achieve its enlistment goals; when conditions improve and labor markets tighten, the Army must respond with increases in resources (budget) levels for targeted and special recruiting programs."⁷⁶ So one of the conclusions that came from these facts is that "the relationship between military and civilian pay can then be a very important determinant to an individual's enlistment decisions."⁷⁷

The second conclusion which came to the military mind was that to encourage the young men to join the army they would have to give them something that would be valuable for their future.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Curtis L. Gilroy, "The All-Volunteer Army: Fifteen Years Later," *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 16, no 3 (spring 1990): 329.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 330.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 331.

In this case it was the opportunity to achieve a higher education at no cost. Taking into account these two conclusions, the dual-market concept was created. The dual-market concept suggested that the youth labor market could be viewed as two large segments.

"One segment of youth was work-oriented, for which the traditional promises of skill training, security, and pay would have great appeal. The second segment was college-oriented youth. Whereas they might consider a relatively brief hiatus between high school and college, their main objective was a post-secondary education. The key, then, was to structure incentive packages that could be differentially applied. On the one hand, the army could offer a traditional incentive package—an 'up front' enlistment bonus—to so-called work-(employment-)oriented youth who were interested in immediate employment, job security, and skill training. On the other hand, college-oriented youth would be offered a deferred reward of substantial educational benefits. Compared to work-oriented youth, this new market is comprised of more educated, higher (AFQT) scoring, 'investment-oriented' individuals." Simply speaking, the army had a choice to either pay more than the civilian market (which was very hard to achieve with so limited a budget), or "it could attempt to address a new market segment—college-bound youth—richer in quality and for which no other service was competing."⁷⁸

The descriptive data from the Army's 1982 New Recruit Survey confirmed, "the most important reason for enlisting among the higher-quality soldiers was money for a college education. This data also provided supporting evidence of the

⁷⁸ Ibid., 344.

dual-market concept: skill training was given as the most important reason for enlistment among lower-quality soldiers.”⁷⁹

This policy also had the support of the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan. By the middle of the ‘80s, commanders were bragging that the force was the smartest, best educated, most trainable, and best disciplined in American history. It was a time of prosperity in the all-volunteer forces in the United States. The quality and the quantity of the troops were at the highest level. After Ronald Reagan left office, the manpower level of the armed forces began to decrease. In 1990, in spite of the significant reduction of the Armed Forces from “2.13 million to 1.36 million,”⁸⁰ the Army was not able to occupy all posts with military staff. In the late 1990s, this trend worsened. “In 1998, Army and Air Force reenlistment rates dropped. In the Air Force and the Navy, aviators and aviation technicians are opting for civilian life at higher than expected rates. The Air Force projects that by 2003 it will be short 2,000 pilots”⁸¹

Also, “since the Persian Gulf War, among all 16-to21-year-old men, the propensity to enlist has declined from 34 percent to 26 percent.”⁸² The question is, why did the dual-market concept fail? One answer is the unpredictable economic growth of the United States, and another is change in the national feelings of the new

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid., 2.

⁸² Ibid., 3.

generation. The new generation very often does not agree with the country's foreign policy that leads to bombing another country (Bosnia) or invading (Haiti)."⁸³

Once more, the United States case gave us the evidence for the thesis that an all-volunteer force does not solve the problem of the manpower shortage. An all-volunteer force can improve the quality and professionalism of the army, but it still will not solve the problem of the need for a constant supply of manpower to the army.

⁸³ To illustrate this point, read the article written by Joseph S Nye Jr., "Redefining the National Interest" published in *Foreign Affairs*, (Jul/Aug 1999) and Samuel P. Huntington, "The Erosion of American National Interests," *Foreign Affairs*, (Sep/Oct 1997).

6. Spanish Case

Spain presents for us the most interesting case because of its many similarities to the Polish problem. First, Spain had a military regime that had a comparable impact on its army and society, as did the communist one in Poland specially when we take into account the 1981 Marshal Law organized by the Polish Army. Second, after the collapse of the regime in Spain, the country and government faced the same problems that Poland did after the collapse of the communist regime. With that in mind, let us look at the Spanish case more deeply.

The Army in Spain, through many years, played a significant role in the political and public life of its country. "Since the collapse of the absolute monarchy in 1808, the army has, with few interruptions, dictated the direction and pace of political change."⁸⁴ The most significant events were: Civil War 1830s, the coups of General Primo de Rivera in 1923 and General Franco and Mola in 1936, that led to the dictatorship of General Franco between 1939 and 1975.

General Franco's regime occupied an important role in the country. The army's representatives formed the government, the main ministerial posts, and other influential positions. During the Franco regime "of the 114 ministers between 1939 and 1975, 40 were military officers, many serving for extended periods."⁸⁵ Many of these offices held the important posts in the civil administration, and on the boards of director of the larger companies.

⁸⁴ Thomas D. Lancaster, and G. Prevost, "Politics and Change in Spain", (New York: Praeger), 94.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 96.

The judiciary system was another organization also controlled by the military through the military courts of justice with extended power. "Military courts possessed permanent jurisdiction over a wide array of political crimes, whether committed by civilians or military personnel."⁸⁶

The military as the tool of Franco's regime had a full control over the military expenditure. "In 1968 salaries consumed 82.4 percent of the army budget, 56.6 percent of the navy budget, and 55.3 percent of the air force budget."⁸⁷ Whereas, the financial resources spent on the modernization and maintenance of the military equipment made up only 7 percent of the army budget. Generally speaking, the military in Spain, during the Franco regime had, at its disposal, 30 percent of the state's budget.

At the beginning of the 1970s, Spain faced the growing opposition of the military staff, mainly from the young and middle age group of the officers, towards the existing situation in the country and the military forces. First, the weak position of the regime towards the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and its violent activity against the high-ranking officers created the feeling of threat within the army staff. They demanded the strong reaction of the government to increase the security for military personnel. Second, the limited possibility of promotion, related to seniority rules, was given a slight possibility for promotion of the junior officers.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 97.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 98.

A group of young officers organized the Democratic Military Union (UMD) in 1974, with the mission of promoting democratic ideas in the Spanish army. The goals of the UMD were to achieve "retirements at earlier ages [to allow the career of young officers], promotions and appointment policies designed to reward merit rather than longevity, or rationalization of officer recruitment and training."⁸⁸

With the death of Franco, the civilians and the military began their transition towards transformation of the country into the democratic form of government ruled by newly elected Prime Minister, Adolfo Suarez. In 1974 the army's function gradually changed from a ruling faction to a service role. More and more governmental post became manned by civilian personnel. Changes were possible due to support by King Juan Carlos and the society for the newly elected government. Another important factor was the prudent tactics towards the hard liners in the military by Prime Minister Suarez. He started by "consulting with the military leadership at each stage of the process"⁸⁹ in such a way that the Generals could still feel themselves as important factions in the country.

Adolfo Suarez, in June 1976 appointed Gen. Manuel Gutierrez Mellado, a sixty-one year-old officer and big supporter of the reforms in the army, as the chief of the army staff.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 99.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 101.

The first attempt at the military reforms came in 1977. Instead of three ministerial posts belonging to three different military branches, the government created only one post manned by the Ministry of Defense. Gutierrez Mellado became the first Minister of Defense.

The Cortez, Spanish Parliament, began debate, in June of 1978, on the Standing General Orders of the Army. The main changes that were proposed included:

- "Relieve soldiers of their personal service to the king.
- Exempted them from executing orders issued by commanding officers in violation of the constitution or of international law.
- Forbade discrimination in recruitment on the basis of politics, social status, or sex."⁹⁰

Reforms were implemented very slowly because of constant fear of coups from the side of hard liners in the army. One attempt of redirecting the existing situation took place "on November 16, 1978, the government uncovered Operation Galexia, a conspiracy led by a Civil Guard officers, Lt. Col. Antonio Tejero Molina, and Capt. Ricardo Saenz de Ynestrillas of the Armed Police."⁹¹ The plan was to capture the members of the cabinet at Monloa Place during discussions on the new constitution, and with the support of the King to redirect the process of reforms.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 106.

⁹¹ Ibid., 109.

The coup was a fiasco, but had a big impact on the politicians who became more sensitive to military demands and the role that the army will play in the future democratic country. Afraid of the next more successful coups attempt, the government decided to take a much stronger position against the ETA organization by sending more troops to the Basques region, the same like De Gaulle did in France.

The government began to propagate campaigns calling for Spanish membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). "Most of the officers corps, particularly in the navy and the air force, favored joining the Atlantic Alliances...officers viewed entry as an opportunity to modernize military equipment and training. Civilian politicians seem to have hoped that NATO membership might distract Spanish officers from domestic politics."⁹²

In addition, to dispose of interfering hard liners "on June 23, 1981, the Cortes approved a bill creating an active reserve to which officers would pass two years earlier than under the previous retirement rules."⁹³

The new Prime Minister, Carlos Sotelo, replaced the seniority rule for promotions in the army with a system based on merit on October 15, 1981.

In this way he disposed of the most difficult and controversial regulation since Franco's regime. The new rule gave the younger officers the chance for quicker promotion, and at the same time, the process replaced the old-fashioned officers with the new wave of younger officers.

Carlo Sotel announced another important act in 1983. He pushed for "the

⁹² Ibid., 114.

⁹³ Ibid., 115.

long-term modernization program (META) that called for expenditures of Pts 308.5 billion in 1984 (out of total defense budget of Pts 552.8 billion), a reversal of the usual allocation of resources and a major commitment to Spain's strategic defense."⁹⁴

President Carlo Sotol, in 1984, created the post of a civilian Minister of Defense, and in this way made the Chief of Staff subordinate to the civilian minister. The next step was to cut the military budget, which brought a significant reduction in the armed forces. "At first, the number of generals was cut by 20 percent and entrants to the General Military Academy was increased from 116 in 1980 to 160 in 1990. Similarly the standing army was reduced from 230,000 to 150,000; the number of military regions was reduced from nine to six; and the number of brigades, from 25 to 14 or 15. The bill promised more rapid career advancement in the future for a streamlined and professionalized officer corps."⁹⁵

The next problem that the Spanish government and the army faced was the significant decrease in morale of army personnel, outflow of military staff from the army caused by the growth of the labor market and a big resistance of the youth towards the service.

The first step taken by the Spanish government was, as previously mentioned, to propagate the idea of NATO membership in order to improve the morale of the military staff.

The second step was the proposition of decreasing conscript service to six

⁹⁴ Ibid., 117.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 118.

months in 1986 to satisfy the dissatisfied society. But this proposal was rejected immediately by the majority of the people. The issue of conscription also dominated the 1989 general elections, when the Spanish people clearly demanded the end of conscription by the government. "Two years later, the Spanish parliament backed a law concerning 'the new model of armed forces and the military service,' which granted a reduction in the length of the military service and simultaneously disciplined the insumisos with an extended prison penalty."⁹⁶

"From 1989 to the present, over 12,000 conscripts have refused to serve both military service and substitute civilian service." Most were prosecuted and served a prison sentence. This created a division within society between those who wanted "the end of conscription as a step towards a non-aggressive defense model and, in the long term, the abolition of the armed forces," and those who wanted a "strong and professional army, and full integration into NATO"⁹⁷ The current size of the Spanish Armed Forces is "226,000 men, 63 percent recruiting through conscription."⁹⁸

In 1999, the Minister of Defense proposed the reduction of the army to 150,000. "This would include 100,000 men in the professional ranks, which means that 69,000 volunteers need to be recruited to add to the existing 31,031."⁹⁹

To illustrate more precisely the problem, compare Spain to France. France is a country that is going to transform its forces to an all-volunteer force but, in contrast to Spain, has a big economic potential and the same public support for the reforms.

⁹⁶ Rafa-A. Kisses, "Does Civil Society Have Any Say?" Available [Online]: <file:///A:/RafaelAjangizTheEndofConscritpion.htm>, 7

⁹⁷ Ibid., 8.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

The French army's total strength is 410,230 soldiers, where 52.2 percent are professional. After reorganization, the French army will consist of 257,100. "The difference will be covered by enlarging the ranks from the present 45,000 men to 92,000. The task, therefore, is to recruit 47,000 more volunteers."¹⁰⁰

Taking into account the population of France and national support for the all-volunteer force by Frenchmen, this task will be much easier to achieve than in the case of Spain. "The Spanish defense budget is one of the smallest in Western Europe: US\$ 7,030 billion a year, 1.54 percent of GNP today, and an average of 1.90 percent from 1986 to 1994. The present situation has been characterized as bankrupt by the chief commander of the armed forces."¹⁰¹

So if Spain thinks seriously about the professional forces, it will have to increase financial resources spent for the army. So far, Spain has a situation similar to that of Poland. People do not want the conscript army, but they also do not want to increase military expending to create an all-volunteer force. If the Spanish government seriously wants to reach an all-volunteer force in 2001, it must reach an agreement with society about what kind of sacrifice they are ready to make for their armed forces.

The more they wait, the less chance for agreement, and the more vulnerable the security of the country becomes.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 8.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 9.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The transition to all-volunteer forces has become the popular trend in modern Western countries. Some transformed their military forces many years ago, some just recently, and there is a group of countries that are in the process of doing so. There are also countries, like Germany and Switzerland that did not and do not plan to create all-volunteer forces.

From these case studies, we can draw conclusions that will help us to further our discussion. First, an all-volunteer force results in an army that is a much more professional, better-trained, and more combat-ready organization, but very costly, so that not many countries can afford to have this type of force.

Second, an all-volunteer force creates a more professional and knowledgeable staff, with better-trained and motivated soldiers, but does not solve the problem of the shortage in manpower. The reason is that even an all-volunteer army is not able to compete with the civilian labor market for lack of financial resources and the difficult condition of the work. One of the solutions found in those countries that change to an all-volunteer force is allowing women to serve. In most countries with all-volunteer forces, women occupy at least 14 percent of the military postings.

Third, the all-volunteer forces have a negative impact on the relationship between the military and society, and also between military and the state. The all-volunteer forces can create "an elite group" of people who live apart from others and who do not integrate with the rest of society. This system creates a large number of people who have never been in the army and who do not know anything about the

army, and sometimes that plays an important role in the government's relationship with the military, because it can create a gap that leads to misunderstanding.

So, the real question is, what is the purpose of transforming an army into an expensive all-volunteer force if such a measure will not produce positive results? Maybe it would be cheaper and easier to improve the existing system in some way—as, for example the German Army increased its level of professionalism, and at the same time stayed with the conscript type of army. This is really difficult to say and even more difficult to predict.

In the next chapter, we will present information about the Polish Armed Forces and its current situation, and we will try to find out how we can improve or change something in order to achieve a much more professional force while using the same financial resources that are allocated by the government.

III. THE POLISH ARMED FORCES: THE HISTORY AND THE FUTURE

A. THE POLISH ARMY FROM 1945 TO 1986

1. Short History

Poland after World War II was fully dominated by the Soviet Union in matters of national and foreign policy, economy, and military forces. "Since the end of [war in 1945], when Moscow's Red Army liberated Poland from German occupation and placed a communist-dominated government in Warsaw, the country has been in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, and its national security concerns and policy have been largely dictated by Soviet security interests."¹⁰² The government, army, and all political institutions were placed under constant control of a communist party, the PZPR (Polish United Worker's Party). The official party statements after 1945 decisively stressed the country's ideological bonds and military alliances with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, and the threat posed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). One of the examples of that ideology was the invasion by Warsaw Pact armies of Czechoslovakia in 1968, in which the Polish Armed Forces took part.

The People's Army (Armia Ludowa) emerged as the force of the newborn Polish government after World War II, backed by the Soviets and the Polish Committee of National Liberation.

¹⁰² Harold D. Nelson, *Poland: A Country Study*, Foreign Area Studies, The American University, (Washington, D.C., January 1983), 290.

"Until after the end of the war, the Polish army, partly because of its somewhat diverse political makeup and partly because of the necessity of defeating the Germans, was not closely involved in the communist consolidation of power and elimination of opponents."¹⁰³

Seeing that unfavorable situation, the Polish government and the party subjected total control over the army with the help of the Soviet Union. One of the steps was the nomination to the position of the Polish Ministry of Defense in 1949 of Soviet Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky. "In addition to Rokossovsky, Soviet officers served as chief of the Polish General Staff, commander of the ground forces, heads of all the service branches, and commanders of the military districts."¹⁰⁴ These changes had instant impact on the loss in the popularity of the armed forces within society. The army was seen not as a defender of the sovereignty of the country, but as the instrument of the Soviet regime.

In 1956, the army played an important role in the first attempt of the Polish people to oppose the totalitarian regime. "In June, soldiers refused to follow orders to fire on workers rioting in Poznan for 'Bread and Freedom.'"¹⁰⁵ This patriotic attitude of the Polish soldiers gave communists authorities a lot to think about, and it also gave the sign that army would not be willing to stand against its own nation in the future.

In answer, the Soviet leaders decided to use troops and tanks to show their power and to suppress the riot. Several Polish military commanders prepared their

¹⁰³ Ibid., 298.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 299.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

troops to fight the invaders, but the skillful negotiation of the Polish authorities with Moscow avoided a confrontation that could have brought a disaster for the Warsaw Pact and Polish citizens.

Although after this incident the tie between the Polish and Soviet armies was loosened, Polish high-ranking officers were still trained in Soviet military schools, military weapons were supplied by the Russians, and all defense planning was coordinated by the Soviet Union.

The above-mentioned incident also had another serious meaning. Soon after, the communist government, using its ideological power, totally subordinated the entire army. The PZPR Political Bureau (Politburo) made all military decisions from then on. The army staff had no influence on army defense matters, including the defense budget. Until 1980, when General Jaruzelski became first secretary of the PZPR, the army was not involved in the formulation of the defense budget.

To control the conscripts in the army, the party organized them into communist youth groups. "In early 1983 the most important of these was the Socialist Union of Military Youth, which sought to impose the moral and ideological outlook of service members; before the Solidarity movement was established, this youth group reportedly counted half the conscripts among its membership."¹⁰⁶

In addition, all military were forced to be a member of the PZPR, and it was a prerequisite for promotion and a better position. "In 1955 only 53 percent of Polish military officers had been members of the PZPR, but by 1958 the proportion had risen to 67 percent. In 1980 about 85 percent of all Polish officers (and all senior

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 301.

officers) were party members.”¹⁰⁷ Another important organization that was created by the party to increase the control of the army was the MPA (The Main Administrative Bureau). The MPA was formally a subdivision of the Ministry of National Defense, and a deputy defense minister headed it. In addition, the MPA had a force of approximately 1,000 specially trained military officers as its tool. “Political officers [as these specially trained officers were called] operated alongside line officers of equal rank down to the battalion level.”¹⁰⁸ The political officers’ power was based on their ability to communicate with all levels of military staff, including conscripts, without informing the responsible commander, and to report directly to superior officers in the MPA without regard for the military chain of command. Because of this, their power was equal to or even higher than that of the commanders from the same unit.

In the 1960s, General Wojciech Jaruzelski was appointed Minister of National Defense. He was the youngest nominated general in the Polish Army. In 1960, he was nominated head of MPA, later deputy defense minister, and then chief of the General Staff.

He is the father of the professional officer corps, which began after World War II. Soon after Gen. Jaruzelski became the Minister of National Defense, he decided to place professional officers, rather than officers more associated with the party, in important military positions. In 1970, shipyard workers from Gdynia and Gdansk organized protest against the economic policy of the government.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

The hard liners inside the government made the decision to use the militia and army to suppress the riots. Most of the military did not support the party's call, and with Gen. Jaruzelski under the leadership they refused to shoot the demonstrators, which meant that only 200-300 workers were killed during this violent confrontation. But this incident had another important outcome. From then on, the party's control over the army diminished almost completely. "In June 1976, when workers in Warsaw and Lodz protested against higher food prices, Jaruzelski reportedly stated that 'Polish soldiers will not fire on Polish workers,' when asked if soldiers could be used to quell the riots."¹⁰⁹ This professional attitude of the Polish Army had the immediate result of increased popularity of the army with the society. "In a poll taken in June 1981 by *Kultura* (Warsaw), the army ranked as the third most respected institution in the country behind the Church and Solidarity."¹¹⁰ In 1980, Poland faced a big wave of strikes from the workers' side, which caused the final break from the communist regime. "On February 11, 1981, Jaruzelski became the Prime Minister, the country's fourth in 12 months."¹¹¹

In October 1981, the PZPR members voted for Gen. Jaruzelski to become the First Secretary of the party. This had an unfavorable impact on the Armed Forces, because suddenly the Minister of Defense became the most powerful man in the country. The country was engulfed in a wave of strikes, political anarchy, corruption, and economic disaster. But the worse was yet to come, because the army became involved in politics, which brought a negative impact later. In December

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 303.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 304.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

1981, Gen. Jaruzelski declared Martial Law. To run the country, he formed the Military Council of National Salvation composed of high-ranking officers. "According to United States officials and press reports during the solidarity period of civil disturbances in 1980-81, Soviet forces were poised to intervene on three occasions (December 1980, April 1981, and June 1981), and Solidarity's initial caution was ascribed to its leaders' fear of Soviet intervention. —Jaruzelski in fact justified his declaration of Martial Law in December 1981 as a Polish solution to the country's difficult civil problems."¹¹² The truth is that this act involving the military in a political matter caused an incalculable amount of damage to the image of the military in the eyes of Polish society. Even when the army, after the "Round Table Discussion," gave the power back to the free by elected democratic government, the leaders of the PZPR and Solidarity could not forgive the army for its use of Martial Law. The end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s can be characterized as the most difficult time for the army in its history.

The disintegration of the military community, the lack of support from society and the government led the army to begin reforms. The first act of these reforms was the creation of the Civilian Ministry of Defense. But this act did not improve the situation or the image of the army; some people even said that it made it worse. The constant disagreement within the civilian ministries of defense and between the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff about the future form of the armed forces, the budget, and military expenditure did not make the problem army better.

¹¹² Ibid. 290.

Summarizing this short overview of the last fifty years of the Polish Army, we can say that many times the army showed very professional behavior towards society and the country, as shown in 1956, 1970, and 1976. To be sure, the current situation of the Polish army was caused by declared Martial Law in 1981, and the moral and patriotic crises in the Polish society were caused by its uneasy history, and by the very deep economic crises of the Polish economy.

2. The Armed Forces: Mission, Organization

The main mission of the Polish Army during the Warsaw Pact was to operate offensively in cooperation with the other armies from the Bloc in the event of a conflict with NATO armies. The additional task was to be ready to defend the national border and to maintain internal security in support of the police. The Chief of the Army was the Ministry of National Defense. At his disposal were five deputy ministers: the Chief of General Staff, the head of the Main Political Administrations, the commander of the Main Inspectorate of Training, the Main Inspectorate of National Territorial Defense, and the Inspectorate of National Civil Defense. The army consisted of ground, naval, air, and air defense forces, but only the chiefs of the naval and air forces reported directly to the minister of national defense. "The ground forces, by far the most important of the group, were commanded by the minister through the General Staff and the commanders of Poland's military districts."¹¹³ The army was divided into the operational army and the National Territorial Defense (Obrona Terytorialna Kraju-OTK) forces. The operational forces manned by 317,000 soldiers were organized and prepared to take part as an integral part of the Joint Armed Forces of allies from the Warsaw Pact. In total, the Polish Land Forces administered fifteen divisions.

¹¹³ Ibid., 113.

3. The Military and Economy

The size and level of military spending under communist rule in Poland was closely related to the role and mission that the Polish Army played in the security of the Warsaw Pact. "Before Jaruzelski attained the premiership and the PZPR leadership, only the party and government leaders—not military officers—were directly involved in formulating the defense budget."¹¹⁴ During the communist regime, the total military budget was between 5 and 9 percent of the total state budget. Usually, the level of the defense budget was based on consultations with the Soviet authorities. "Economist Thad Alton and others, in a study on East European military spending prepared for the United States Congress in 1981, estimated that the Polish defense budget in the 1970s generally appropriated nearly 80 percent of the total military spending to operations, maintenance, and procurement; nearly 20 percent to personnel (military pay and subsistence); and some 3 to 4 percent on research and development costs associated with Poland's arms industry."¹¹⁵

The Polish military industry was also under the control of the Soviet Union. They produced equipment that was designed, specified, and standardized by the Soviets. Polish factories had the permission to produce Soviet-type jet fighters, tanks, and ships. The main recipients were countries from the Warsaw Pact and other countries oriented towards the communist ideology: China, Cuba, and some Arabic and African countries.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 309.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

"The armed forces also have been given tasks that contributed to the national economy. The quartermaster general has supervised crop production and animal husbandry on military reservations."¹¹⁶ Because of that action, most of the line units were self-sufficient. The army, mainly the engineer and transportations units, were very often used to help the civilian population in constructing roads, bridges, and other necessary projects. It is impossible to estimate how big a contribution to the national economy was made, but it was surely significant.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. 311

4. Manpower

The conscript army in Poland was established by virtue of the Constitutional legacy that said, "The defense of the Fatherland is the most solemn obligation of every citizen,"¹¹⁷ that reached the age of eighteen. Approximately sixty percent of the entire military (and seventy five percent of its ground forces) were conscript soldiers. Those people, who failed to register for military service because of health, family problems, or different religious beliefs, could serve in voluntary alternative service. "The alternative service lasted 24 months [the same as military service], and could mean working in health care units, social welfare, serving in fire-fighting units or in the Citizen's Militia (Milicja Obywatelska-MO)."¹¹⁸ Another form of alternate military service was the civil defense unit that was trained to lend assistance to people in case of national disaster or war. In Poland each year, there were 256.000 men eligible to perform military service. "During the 1950s all male college students earned an officer's commission in the reserves after taking some military courses and a limited amount of drilling with a reserve unit (no more than 30 days per year)."¹¹⁹ The form and period of military training for college graduates differed through the years. If they failed their final exams, the students had to go into normal military service. If they passed, they became non-commissioned officers (NCO) and went to the reserves.

After college young men could also become officers by going to fourteen different types of military academies. Because most of the youths treated the army

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 306.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 307.

as a supporter of the communist regime, the army could not count on well-educated people. "In the first years after the formation of the Polish People's Army, the military operated on the principle that 'sheer will' rather than academic degrees made an officer."¹²⁰ The problem is that in many cases those people occupy important positions in the Polish Army today. Those who were platoon leaders, company and battalion commanders, and some who were teachers in military schools had a big impact on the future military generation and army image. Those who were "discharged from active duty were placed on reserve status until they reached the age of fifty (sixty in the case of officers and NCOs). Women without children who had left military service remained on reserve status until age forty (age fifty if they were officers or NCOs)."¹²¹ The reservist could be called for no more than twenty-four months of training during the entire reserve period.

To promote the defense idea to the children and teenagers, there were classes in the schools, which taught the students basic information about the country, the army, and self defense. In 1989, the army created three military colleges where students received not only a general education, but also a military one. The school was free, but students had to sign an agreement that after graduation they would go to a chosen military academy.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid., 308.

The main goal of those colleges was to better prepare young people for the military profession. After seven years, those colleges were closed because of the change in the political situation in Poland. The new authorities were afraid that those colleges would teach young people the old communist ideas and propaganda.

With the beginning of democratic reforms and economic growth, which caused increased competition in the labor market, the army faced increased opposition from youth towards compulsory service. Many of those who had to go into the army behaved very badly. More and more people tried to avoid military service by using loopholes in military law, or by fabricating health or family problems. The whole situation was worsened by unfavorable discussions about the military service between politicians and society. The lack of support for the army from politicians and society very soon caused a decrease in the quality of people who went to military schools and served in the army. The reality was that only the "stupid and poor" considered or served in the army.

5. Education, Training, and Promotion

All military training and education were under the control of the Main Inspectorate of Training in Communist Poland. This department was headed by a deputy minister of national defense. From the beginning, military training was standardized to ensure the success of the joint operation with the Warsaw Pact armies. What this meant was that all procedures, tactics, strategy, and weapons were unified within the communist countries. In the same way that NATO did and does, "Conscript training involved winter programs consisting primarily of individual training, care and use of small arms, work with crew-served weapons or heavy equipment, and drills with small groups. Summer programs were devoted to field training and involved participation in company, battalion, and regiment exercises."¹²² Each year, usually in the fall, big exercises were organized with the participation of other Warsaw Pact armies and the highest-level authorities from those countries. Currently, these kinds of exercises are organized also, but only for the President and members of Parliament and government.

For the conscript, the highest rank he could achieve was private first class. To become an NCO, a private had to graduate from a special military school in order to acquire skills in leadership, weapons training, and teaching. NCO's were usually required to sign a contract with the army for four years of additional service, warrant officers for six, and officers for twelve.

¹²² Ibid., 320.

Warrant Officers were boys who did not graduate from colleges. In 1981, there were thirteen warrant officer schools "offering one-to three-year training programs in broad range of military technical subjects."¹²³

To become an officer, college graduates had to choose one of fourteen higher officer candidate schools for four years of education and receive a baccalaureate degree and a commission as second lieutenant. Another choice for more ambitious people was military academies (technical, medical, and navy), lasting five to six years and awarding the master's degree. Unlike most other military schools, neither the technical nor medical academy suffered from a lack of highly qualified candidates.

The next level of military training for officers was through two higher-level military schools. "The Polish Armed Service General Staff Academy offered course work in advanced military theory to field grade officers; the Academy of Political and Military Sciences was designed specifically to instruct senior political officers."¹²⁴ Most of the commanders in Poland are graduates of the General Staff Academy. For officers with an aspiration to the rank of general, there was the higher-level training at Voroshilov Academy in the Soviet Union. The biggest problem with a military education was that some schools accepted boys without regard to their education level or abilities.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

The second problem was that the level of education and training at military academies was based on old, Soviet models from World War II that had not been modified. Those two problems combined to make military schools popular with boys for whom military schools were the last chance to achieve some type of higher degree and secure a job for the future. This situation resulted in gradual degradation in all levels of military staff, and in the next step for the level of training in the Polish Armed Forces.

B. 1981-1989 THE POLISH ARMY COLLAPSE

The Polish Armed Forces during the period from 1981 to 1989 played a major role in the political and social transformation of Poland. But the armed forces were slowly losing everything that they had been able to achieve during the communist era: patriotism, professionalism, and a non-political character. In addition, the army lost respect not only for the new political authorities ruling the country, but also most importantly in the eyes of the common citizen. Society could not forget that its military had stood against its own nation.

These and other reasons contributed to the wave of criticism towards the armed forces that is faced even today. To prevent another army coup, the new government undertook several steps to weaken the military position. First, the government drastically reduced the military budget, withheld privileges, and replaced unfavorable staff. Those acts worsened the living conditions for troops in the barracks and the standard of living for military families. Second, every military contract with the Soviet Union was broken by an offensive policy of Polish government against that country, which resulted in a shortage of new equipment, a lack of spare parts for the existing equipment, and the withdrawal of all agreements on the production of Soviet-type equipment in Polish factories. Those steps caused a long-term reduction in the equipment-readiness so important to the security of the country. Suddenly, the army faced depletion of new equipment and spare parts without any substitutions, since the government could not afford to buy new items from Western countries. The whole situation grew beyond the control of the government and the military authorities. In a very short period, the new government

through its desperate behavior destroyed the military capabilities of the army that was recognized as the second most powerful army in the former Warsaw Pact.

C. THE FIRST ATTEMPT AT REFORMS

The reforms began with the qualification of the framework for the new Polish security policy and defense doctrine after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Poland decided to found its new security policy on three principal pillars:

- “Development of good-neighborly relations and regional cooperation in Central Europe.
- Participation in all-European cooperative arrangements, and support for the UN global system of security.
- Integration with West European and Euro-Atlantic security structure—NATO, the Western European Union, and the European Union.”¹²⁵

The participation in Partnership for Peace program leading to membership in NATO became one of the main priorities for the new Polish foreign policy with big support from Polish citizens. The first documents referred into the new policy were: The Tenets of Polish Security Policy (1992) and The Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland (1992),¹²⁶ as well as a long-term modernization program that corresponded to the new budget program.

The decisions following those documents caused the reduction of the army from 406,000 in 1989 to 230,000, in accordance with the CFE treaty. The next change referred to the new localization of the units.

“While 75 percent of Polish units were previously located in the Western part of the country, 10 percent in the central, and only a small part in the Eastern are,

¹²⁵“NATO in Poland’s Security Policy.” Available [Online]: < <http://www.wp.mil.pl/integral.1.html>, 1

¹²⁶ “The Reforms of Poland’s Defense System.” Available [Online]: < <http://www.wp.mil.pl/integral.4.html>, 1

currently about 45 percent are located in the West, 30 percent in Central Poland and about 25 percent in the Eastern part of the country.”¹²⁷ This change resulted in the creation of a new military district with headquarter in Crakow.

The next step of the reforms was the institution of civilian control over the army. The act from 14 December 1995 described the role and function of the civilian Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff, and the commanders of the armed services.

One year earlier, in 1994, the first foundation of the reforms in Polish Armed Forces had been prepared. The most important points were:

- The creation of a separate service of Land Forces and the establishment of their command.
- The development of a concept for new command and staff structures corresponding to those in NATO countries.
- A change in the structure of divisions from regiment- to brigade-based.
- The organization of two corps of air defense with one air corps in the Air Force.
- The initiation of modernization of the defense infrastructure, including the logistic systems of NATO countries.
- The launching of governmental programs of technical modernization of the armed forces.¹²⁸

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 2.

The other activity of the Polish authorities was increased military cooperation with the neighborhood countries such as Germany, Denmark, France or Ukraine. That cooperation resulted in the creation of Ukraine-Polish battalion or Danish-German-Polish Multinational Core stationed in Szczecin.

In reality, most of these reforms remained on paper. The biggest changes took place at the highest level of the military hierarchy. Usually, it consisted of changing names, signs, and buildings. But nobody was eager to begin reforms in the lower units, because no one knew how or where to begin, or at which point. The main reason was the lack of money and inclination. From the standpoint of the Ministry of Defense staff, it was quite difficult to assume the real level of military readiness. Most of the commanders, because of fear of their superiors or of losing their posts, were willing to give false information about morale, discipline, and the readiness of the military equipment. Even young officer platoon leaders and company commanders were forced to give false information. The entire situation lasted almost seven years, during which the level of readiness in the armed forces dropped catastrophically. Everything was finally brought to light when some military personnel gave information to the press about what was going on in the army. The controllers who were sent afterwards by the Ministry of Defense only confirmed the difficult situation in the army. This was the main reason for the beginning of the next reforms that were planned with a fifteen-year perspective beginning in 1999. The main points of those reforms included:

- Improvement of the command systems at all levels

- Modernization of basic weapons and equipment to bring them closer to NATO technological standards.
- Reduction of armed forces personnel to about 180,000 (that is 0.5 percent of the population).
- Cutting the length of conscript service from 18 to 12 months.
- Adaptation of the military education system to the new requirements.
- Increase of funds allocated for military education.
- Ensuring the financial stability of the armed forces (committed to NATO) and the territorial defense forces.
- Preparation of selected units in each of the three services to become part of NATO's rapid reaction forces.
- Preparation of selected units for operation within multinational corps.¹²⁹

In addition, the government, after consultation with the Ministry of Defense, prepared the budget for 1999. See Table. 2 on the next page.

¹²⁹ "The Reforms of Poland's Defense System." Available [Online]:< <http://www.wp.mil.pl/integral4.html> 3

TABLE 2.

MOD Budget expenditures for 1999 in comparison with 1998 by main

section and subsections (in thousands of PLN)

Budget part by sections and subsections	1998 Budget	*/1998 Budget at 1999 conditions	1999 Budget	% change between 4/2	% change between 4/3
1	2	3	4	5	6
National Defense	8,358,713	9,152,324	8,997,660	107,6	98,3
Military Lodging Agency	350,653	382,212	332,588	94,8	87,0
Army	4,329,583	4,658,631	4,541,027	104,9	97,5
Air Forces	2,035,734	2,245,415	2,168,417	106,5	96,6
Navy	735,670	797,466	766,814	104,2	96,2
Other Units	808,743	962,404	1,087,153	134,4	113,0
Military Intelligence Service	98,330	106,196	101,661	103,4	95,7


*/ Taking into account Aimed Reserves of the State Budget, the MoND udget
is 2.11% of GDP

Source: Table adapted from *The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland-the
multimedia guide-book*, [CD-ROM] (Warsaw: Bellona Publishing House,
1999).

Those numbers look very impressive, but the real value of the money that was assigned to the Ministry of Defense and beyond to all branches was less in comparable to the previous years, which is illustrated in Figure 1

FIGURE 3.

MOD BUDGET EXPENDITURES
as a % of GDP and as a % of State Budget
Over the years 1991-1999



Source: Table adapted from *The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland-the multimedia guide-book*, [CD-ROM] (Warsaw: Bellona Publishing House, 1999).

This budget was prepared for the reforms called “Armia 2012.” But, after joining Poland to the NATO defense organization on 12 March 1999, everybody suddenly realized that the military budget would not meet the new task that Poland was given by NATO authorities. Today we know that the plan “Armia 2012” was rejected in favor of the new reform plan for the years 2001-2006. Under this plan, including NATO funds, the Polish Army will allocate the main financial resources to the modernization of military airfields, harbors, and fuel bases.

In addition, the Ministry of Defense will allocate more money to modernization that includes purchasing new equipment and increasing military staff salaries. According to the defense commission from Parliament, The Ministry of Defense has to decide in 2000 on: the new multi-function air jet and helicopter, armored personal carrier (APC), and anti-tank missile.

But the Polish Army faces not only financial problems. The other problem is a shortage of young people going into the army. According to the latest information, of 320,000 young people each year, only every seventh person is going into the army. "Approximately 15 percent of all recruits malingers with a different kind of illness. The most common sicknesses are drug habits and alcoholism."¹³⁰ Some officers in the Polish Army maintain that only the stupid and the poor go into the army today. The wealthy will always find some way to avoid that responsibility.

The next problem is the very poor standard of living for military families. According to the newspapers, four percent of all military families live at the poverty level. Almost three-fourth of military families receive the salaries that enable them to live on the level of social minimum and only one-fourth of the families have a good standard of living.

Because of this, many staff members have to work part-time job to support their own families.

This situation of course has a bad impact on the quality and level of professionalism of Polish officers and NCOs. People in the army currently focus not on how to train soldiers, but on how to guarantee the military family's existence.

¹³⁰ Dariusz Rembelski, "Symulowany pobor," *Polska Zbrojna*, no. 46 (November 1999): 17.

Another problem that is also related to military salaries is the lack of young officers and WOs in the line units on the important military posts such as platoon leaders and deputy platoon leaders. After one year of service, many young boys either try to go to staff work or leave the army. The main reason is very poor work conditions.

As we can see, the situation of the Polish Army is not very good. The attempted reforms are being conducted very slowly and unsuccessfully. In the next chapter we will present some ideas that could help reform the Polish Army without a huge commitment of financial resources.

IV. CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS, PROPOSALS FOR POLICY AND FORCE STRUCTURE

During the period of 1991-99, Polish civil and military authorities tried in different ways to reform the military forces to save them from further disintegration. We know that this was not an easy process. Because of that we will examine some ideas and possible solutions, which if implemented, could help the Polish Army transform itself into a much better and more powerful defense structure. These ideas are a result of analyzing the case studies of several countries that have all-volunteer force armies e.g. the United States and Great Britain; countries that have still draft system, e.g., Germany; and the previous and current situations of Poland and the Polish Army. The recommendations will focus on whether or not Poland should move to an all-volunteer force, education and training, strategy formulation, acquisitions, and budgeting. In all of these proposed reforms, clarity and accountability should be emphasized in the decision-making processes of the civilian and military authorities.

First, from the analysis of the Polish case study, the Polish Army and the country are not ready to transform their forces into an all-volunteer force. This type of military force is very expensive, and taking into account the weak Polish economy, it would be unreasonable to do so at this time. In ten to fifteen years it might be feasible, but right now it is not.

Second, Poland, should now be considering adopting the German Army model, based on the draft and with increased professionalization of the main military posts. Having the conscript type of army at this time would be more reasonable and less costly for Poland, and the Polish army could more easily reorganize its existing

structure by imitating the German model. In this way, Poland would be able to maximize the professionalization of the army at minimum cost.

Now let us look at the Polish Army case study discussed above. To begin with, one of the main causes of the reform failures was the lack of a common military policy between civilian authorities in Poland (e.g., the President, Parliament, and the Minister of Defense) and the military commanders with the Chief of Staff. Those organizations have to put aside their private ambitions and start to think about the security of their country and the well being of their citizens. To create a good defense policy, high-quality cooperation is needed between the people who have an influence on it. In this case, the President, Parliament, and the Ministry of Defense represent the government and the army in one body and have to make all decisions with the military personnel as their advisors, and together create sound defense policy.

In addition, there must be increased accountability in the decisions of several civil and military authorities in relation to the reorganization and relocation of military units, especially in financial and logistic matters. For example, there was the case of an armored brigade that was moved back and forth three times with all its equipment and people, before somebody decided on its final location. This was a clear example wasting of money and time.

Another example is financing of laboratory projects that are already obsolete. For example, the project of the multi-function jet "Iryda," which after ten years of funding, was suddenly scrapped. Sometimes it is cheaper to buy new equipment

from another country than create something only because of national pride or national sentiment.

Another example of unreasonable military expenditures is the latest decision made by the Ministry of Defense for the purchase of a 109MM self-propelled howitzer. First, this decision to purchase was not discussed with anybody from the Defense Commission in Parliament. Second, even if the Minister believed that the Polish Armed Forces needed this kind of equipment, the subject should have been discussed with experts from the artillery branch.

Now let us look at a different problem, which is the training and education of the Polish Army. So far, in the Polish Military Educational System the military staff was prepared for the profession in different types of military schools: six, four, three years, and three months for the conscripts. That type of education was providing excellent military preparation, but a very weak general education. Seeing the experiences of other Western armies, it would be beneficial to reform the military education system to a type similar to that used in those countries. The army should recruit young men after they have received a certain level of civilian education, and then provide them with different kinds of short-term courses and training to prepare them for their military professions. For example, in the United States during the six-month the Basic and Advanced Officers Courses in Fort Benning, the young men are trained to be platoon leaders first and then company commanders. The six- or four-year schools are too long and too costly for the army, because the truth is that the real knowledge the young officers or WOs are receiving is in the unit working with the soldiers.

Another problem that is closely related to the subject of education is the quality of the teachers in these schools. Usually in Poland there are teachers who are Lieutenant Colonels or Colonels in Poland, highly experienced, but they saw the real unit for the last time ten years ago, so their experiences are also ten years old. The point is that the teachers in military schools should come from the line units by means of a reward for good work. In this way, the best company commanders would come to schools as teachers of the subject that they know best, not only from the literature, but also from practical experience. After two years of teaching, a new group of teachers would replace them. Right now, one of the main reasons the young second lieutenants leave the army is because many times theory and reality are totally different.

Another important problem is the shortage of the manpower in the army. Looking once more at the experiences of the Western armies, we can say that this problem could be not completely solved but minimized in two ways: first, by increasing the salaries in the military to be equal to those of other agencies, also subsidized by the government, such as the police; second, by staffing some military posts with women. Many times we can see officers or WOs working in the brigade or division staff and doing the paperwork that could be done by women.

The next problem that we will discuss and that can be solved without any big financial expenditure is the improvement of the relationship between the people in the army, mainly in the line units where there is the most difficult service. In the Polish Army, there are a lot of unwritten customs that remain from previous times. One of them is the fear of superiors. Another is the statement that the subordinate is

not allowed to think, only to execute given orders. We can say that this is the most devastating problem for the Polish Army. First, because of fear most of the reports that are sent to superiors are not accurate or are only partially accurate. Second, most of the training in the units or in the exercise training fields is prepared for the controlling officer. It happens that the main point of the training is to pass the exam in the eyes of the controller. This procedure is destructive not only to the good of the army, but also to the level for training of the soldiers. To solve that problem, many people in uniform will have to change their mentality from "I am the boss" to "I have more knowledge so I have to help the younger officer." Second, everybody in uniform will have to realize that they are on the same team. If they do not help each other, nobody will help them.

The last problem that does not require any financial cost is the increased feeling of respect from society towards the armed forces. First, if the military personnel do not treat themselves with the respect, they cannot expect it from society. Second, the army should focus its educational programs on military values such as honor, duty, and patriotic sentiment. There should be more respect from everybody, not only from the military, for national symbols, e.g., the national anthem and the flag, national emblems. The military should have respect for the uniform and military traditions. Everybody should see the army as a professional organization of highly motivated people.

Summarizing the last chapter and entire thesis, most of the problems that were presented here do not require big financial expenditures. But if they are implemented, they will improve in significant ways the quality and combat-readiness

of the Polish Military Forces. Those changes need only the people's willingness for self-improvement and their goodwill.

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